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EVIDENCE
I.

EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS: THE COMMON SCHEME

EXCEPTION

In State v. Stokes,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
found prejudicial error in the admission of a child's testimony
that the defendant had previously attempted to molest her. Appellant was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a girl who
came to his home to buy a frozen treat. Another child was allowed to testify that defendant-appellant had offered her money
to "meet him at the railroad tracks." 2 Although the meeting did
not occur, the child was permitted to speculate that the defendant invited her there to rape her.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the grounds that evidence of other bad acts is generally inadmissible and that the lower court incorrectly applied the "common scheme" exception to admit the testimony. As enunciated
in State v. Wilson s and State v. Lyle,' the exception applies to
1. 279 S.C. 191, 304 S.E.2d 814 (1983).

2. Record at 35.
3. 274 S.C. 635, 266 S.E.2d 426 (1980). In Wilson, the defendant's conviction of first

degree criminal sexual conduct and burglary was reversed. The supreme court held as
error the admission at trial of evidence that the defendant had been identified in connection with an attempted criminal sexual offense and a Peeping Tom offense which had

occurred in the same vicinity three months subsequent to the offense charged. Id. at 636,
266 S.E.2d at 427. The court found that the evidence did not establish the identity of the

defendant or demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Id. at 637, 266 S.E.2d at 427. The
cohrt further held that where any doubt exists as to the connection between the evidence
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"a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the others." 5 The court in Stokes held that it is not
sufficient to establish the commission of two similar crimes by
the same person. Rather, the evidence may not be admitted unless there is no doubt as to a connection between the acts.6
The record in this case did not show a connection between
the two acts alleged. Furthermore, there was no evidence that
the defendant actually intended to rape the other child since the
child was merely expressing her own conclusion. The error of admitting the testimony was intensified, the court held, by instructions that the jury consider the testimony to establish the defendant's propensity to commit the type of crime charged. Because
this instruction is directly opposed to the basic rationale for excluding this type of evidence, reversal was compelled.
II.

CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE AND PREJUDICE

Evidence which is otherwise admissible may be excluded, in
the trial court's discretion, when its reception would waste time
because it is merely cumulative.7 The concept of cumulative evi-

and the crime charged, the evidence is inadmissible. Id. at 638, 266 S.E.2d at 427.
4. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). The supreme court in Lyle held that evidence
of other crimes is inadmissible when offered merely to raise the inference of guilt, as it
compels the defendant to answer charges which were not raised in the indictment. Id. at
416, 118 S.E. at 807. Any similarity between the crime charged and the evidence of other
crimes must be such that it logically excludes the possibility that the crime could have
been committed by anyone other than the defendant. Id. at 420, 118 S.E. at 808. Furthermore, any serious doubt as to the admissibility of the evidence is always resolved in
the defendant's favor. Id. at 437, 118 S.E. at 814.
5. 279 S.C. at 193, 304 S.E.2d at 815.
6. The common scheme exception to the rule against hearsay has been deemed inapplicable by a similar rationale in a number of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harper v.
State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982) (a separate and independent offense is generally
inadmissible except where a logical connection between the two crimes exists); Scott v.
State, 162 Ga. App. 541, 292 S.E.2d 125 (1982)(evidence of other bad acts is inadmissible
as it tends to place character in issue, but inay be used to show identity, motive or plan);
State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982)(evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if its only relevancy is to show character of accused); State v. Caudill, 289
S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 1982)(evidence relating to a crime that defendant is accused of committing, other than that charged, is not generally admissible to prove offense for which
he is on trial).
7. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1016 (1964). C.J.S. defines this type of evidence as:
additional evidence of the same kind tending to prove the same point as other
evidence already given; evidence which merely strengthens a party's position
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dence is also related to the determination of whether evidence
improperly admitted has a prejudicial effect, since if the evidence objected to is merely cumulative to evidence properly admitted, it may be held harmless.' All of this is logically reasonable. The obverse is more difficult. Can error which standing
alone is relatively harmless combine with other errors of the
same type and "accumulate" to a point of demonstrable harm?
A case in point is State v. McFarlane.9
Appellant McFarlane was convicted of violating section 1615-140 of the South Carolina Code' 0 by sexually molesting a tenyear-old girl while teaching her to swim at a PTL day camp in
York County, South Carolina. No physical injury was alleged to
have resulted from the incident.'" The evidence against McFarlane consisted of the complaining child's testimony and of testimony from her cousin, aunt, and mother regarding her accounts
of the incident some hours after it occurred.' 2 McFarlane chose
not to testify after the trial court ruled that his prior guilty pleas
for child molestation and manslaughter could be admitted for
the purpose of impeachment.' 3 The trial court refused to subpoena an out-of-state physician who would have testified that
there was no evidence of physical harm to the child, 4 and refused to admit the doctor's report in his absence."" Finally, the
trial court sustained an objection to McFarlane's effort to ques-

on a conflict already existing in the evidence produced at the trial. Evidence of
a different kind or of other and different circumstances tending to establish or
disprove the same fact is not cumulative.
Id. at 623. See also Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co., 188 S.C. 149, 198 S.E. 395 (1938);
McCabe v. Sloan, 184 S.C. 158, 191 S.E. 905 (1937).
8. See Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965); Spillers v. Clay, 233 S.C.
99, 103 S.E.2d 759 (1958); Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86 S.E.2d 867 (1955).
9. 279 S.C. 327, 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983).
10. It shall be unlawful for any person over the age of fourteen years to wilfully
and lewdly commit or attempt any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the
body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of fourteen
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child. Anyone violating the
provisions of this section shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (1976).
11. Record at 22.
12. Id. at 13-73.
13. Id. at 15-18.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 90.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 36

tion the victim's mother about contemplated litigation.16

McFarlane raised five points on appeal, all of which were
rejected by the South Carolina Supreme Court and one of which,
the refusal to permit cross-examination on contemplated litiga-

tion, is discussed in part III of this section. In sustaining the
trial court's refusal to subpoena the out-of-state physician, the

supreme court noted that the applicable statute17 places a great
deal of discretion in the trial court and held that this discretion
was properly exercised because the physician's testimony would
not have been relevant to a material issue. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected McFarlane's claim that medical evidence showing a lack of physical harm would have tended to
contradict the child's testimony that McFarlane "tried to pull
[her] apart." 8 The exclusion of the physician's written report
was justified on the same grounds, and on the additional basis
that the report could not be properly authenticated under the
South Carolina business records statute in the absence of the
physician or records keeper.19 Finally, on the issue of admissibil16. Id. at 83.
17. The statute provides as follows:
If a person in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding
persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions or
grand jury investigations commenced or about to commence in this State is a
material witness in a prosecution pending in a court of record in this State or
in a grand jury investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a
judge of such court may issue a certificate under the seal of the court stating
these facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required.
Such certificate may include a recommendation that the witness be taken into
immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this State to assure his attendance in this State. The certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court
of record in the county in which the witness is found.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-9-70 (1976).
18. Record at 27.
19. 279 S.C. at 329, 306 S.E.2d at 612-13. The business records statute provides in
part:
[T]he term "business" shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions whether carried on for profit or not.
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event and if,
in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation
were such as to justify its admission.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-510 (Supp. 1983). The court noted that the detective who requested and received the physician's report clearly could not testify to its identification
and mode of preparation, or whether it was made in the ordinary course of business at or
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ity of the hearsay testimony of the mother and aunt, the supreme court held that there was no prejudice to the defendant
because the testimony was merely cumulative to the testimony
of the minor cousin, which was received without objection.2"
The thread running through all of these holdings is that
none of the matters complained of is, in itself, an error significant enough to warrant a retrial. This is arguably true, although
it is possible that the trial might have been quite different if
McFarlane had been faced only with the testimony of two children rather than that of two children and two adults, had been
able to take the stand to deny the children's story, had been
able to reveal the bias of the complainant's mother, and had
called an examining physician who would have testified to the
lack of physical evidence corroborating the girl's story. The
court, however, did not consider the objections in the aggregate
but dealt with each one separately.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,21 the United States Supreme

Court considered the application of several rules of evidence, including the voucher rule, the state's rule on adversity, and the
state's refusal to allow a declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. The Court found that each of the
rules of evidence considered was not only constitutionally sound,
but was also properly applied to the Chambers issues. However,
the cumulative effect of the rules and their application produced
a denial of Chambers' due process right to a fair trial.2
It seems beyond argument that if cumulative non-error can
produce error, then cumulative harmless error can also produce
reversible error. While the court in McFarlanedoes not indicate
that it considered the concept of cumulative harm, it would
seem that the court has a constitutional obligation to do so.
The McFarlane case has a sufficient number of "harmless
errors" to necessitate a consideration of the impact of Chambers. This might suggest to attorneys appealing cases which contain multiple errors, the significance of including an allegation
that the combination of adverse rulings constituted a violation
of due process of law even if no single error is clearly reversible.

near the time of the incident. 279 S.C. at 330, 306 S.E.2d at 613.
20. Id.
21. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
22. Id. at 302-03.
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Such an assignment of error should necessitate a cumulative error analysis by the court.
III.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

CONCERNING OTHER LITIGATION

In South Carolina, cross-examination is limited only by relevance, and may include facts tending to discredit the witness.2
When litigants seek to introduce evidence of other litigation involving participants in the case, the basic rule of relevance still
applies.
One use of evidence of other litigation is to demonstrate
that a witness is biased.24 Since 1978, the supreme court has
held that it is proper to cross-examine a witness concerning past
or pending litigation between the witness and the party against
whom he or she is testifying.25 In State v. McFarlane,26 the
court extended this rule to permit inquiry about litigation which
is not "past or pending," but merely contemplated. In that case,
the mother of an alleged victim of child molestation testified, on
cross-examination, that her attorney was present in the courtroom. The trial court sustained an objection, however, to a further question as to whether she was contemplating a lawsuit.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that, "Evidence of contemplated litigation is relevant and admissible to demonstrate
bias."' 27 However, the court declined to order reversal on this ba-

sis, holding any error harmless because McFarlane failed to
make an offer of proof when the state's objection was sustained
and because the state presented "overwhelming evidence of
guilt.

'28

The court did find reversible error in the admission of evi-

dence of other lawsuits in Wooten v. Amspacher.29 The defen-

23. Hansson v. Gen. Insulation & Acoustics, 234 S.C. 177, 180, 107 S.E.2d 41, 42
(1959).
24. In demonstrating the bias or prejudice of a witness, the party may inquire into
any fact which might demonstrate that witness' hostility to the party and thus impair his
credibility. 81 Ahi. JUR.2D Witnesses § 561 (1976).
25. North Greenville College v. Sherman Construction Co., 270 S.C. 553, 243 S.E.2d

441 (1978).
26. 279 S.C. 327, 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983).
27. Id. at 331, 306 S.E.2d at 613.
28. Id. For a discussion of the circumstances of this case, see text accompanying
notes 9-20, supra.
29. 279 S.C. 325, 307 S.E.2d 232 (1983).
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dant in this survival action was permitted to cross-examine the
plaintiff about lawsuits against a closely held corporation of
which the decedent was president. Defendants argued that because the other suit involved a separation agreement between
plaintiff and her late husband, it was relevant to plaintiff's damages for loss of financial support and companionship.30 The
court, however, fatally undercut this argument by adopting the
general rule that evidence of separation, divorce, or subsequent
remarriage is not admissible in a survival action since damages
are based on the decedent's injuries rather than on the plaintiff's
own losses.3 1 The court reasoned:
We fail to comprehend how that evidence [of other litigation]
relates to the present survival action. Although the range and
extent of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of
the trial judge, the testimony must relate to matters pertinent
to the issue or to specific acts which 32tend to discredit the witness or impeach his moral character.
Because questioning about litigation involving the separation
agreement failed to meet this standard, its allowance by the trial
court was grounds for a new trial.
IV.

THE SCOPE OF PROSECUTORIAL ARGUMENT: COMMENTS ON
THE EVIDENCE

The dual role of the prosecutor-as a vigorous advocate of
the guilt of the accused and as an officer of the state charged

30. Brief of Respondent at 3-11.
31. 279 S.C. at 326, 307 S.E.2d at 233. The applicable statute provides that:
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and trespasses to and
upon real estate and any and all injuries to the person or to personal property
shall survive both to and against the personal or real representative, as the
case may be, of a deceased person and the legal representative of an insolvent
person or a defunct or insolvent corporation, any law or rule to the contrary
notwithstanding.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-90 (1976).
The supreme court earlier held that evidence of a surviving spouse's remarriage is
inadmissible in wrongful death actions. Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470
(1972). This policy reflects a desire to avoid comparisons between the deceased husband
and a present spouse. An evaluation of the relative merits of spouses has no bearing on
the damages claimed.
32. 279 S.C. at 326, 307 S.E.2d at 233.
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with seeing that justice is done 5s--was of concern to the South
Carolina Supreme Court in City of Cayce v. Graves.34 The case
dealt with the permissible scope of a prosecutor's closing argument and the extent to which he may comment on the evidence,
specifically the special status of the accused as a public official.
Appellee Graves, a member of the South Carolina state legislature, was arrested in Cayce, South Carolina for driving under
the influence of intoxicants, in violation of a state statute5 and
a city ordinance.36 A state highway patrolman testified at trial
that Graves was so intoxicated that it was necessary to drive him
home. 37 In a jury trial before the Cayce City Recorder, Graves'
status as a legislator was repeatedly mentioned by the prosecution and also alluded to by the defense.3 8 In argument, Graves'
counsel told the jury that Graves was not asking for special
treatment because of his official position. 39 Counsel for the city,
in closing argument, said: "Talk about special treatment. You
get locked up tommorrow night and put in jail and see if the
highway patrol will provide you with taxi service home....
Was he ever locked up? Was he ever put in a cell? Absolutely
not. Special treatment. ' 40 The trial court overruled Graves' objection to this line of argument, but on appeal the circuit court
reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the recorder erred in admitting evidence
of the highway patrol's treatment of Graves, since it was wholly
irrelevant to Graves' guilt and was potentially prejudicial.4 The
court cited prior cases for the principle that, "[W]hile a prosecutor should prosecute vigorously, his arguments must be carefully
tailored to avoid appealing to a juror's personal bias or arousing
33. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159

(1958).
34. 279 S.C. 54, 301 S.E.2d 755 (1983).
35. It is unlawful for any person who is a habitual user of narcotic drugs or any
person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquors, narcotic drugs, barbiturates, paraldehydes or drugs, herbs or any other substance of like character,
whether synthetic or natural, to drive any vehicle within this State.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (1976).
36. Graves was charged with a violation of the Cayce ABC provisions which prohibit
open containers of alcohol in vehicles.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Record at 53.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40, 73-76, 81-82.
Id. at 86.
279 S.C. at 55, 301 S.E.2d at 755.
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his passion or prejudice." 42
Chief Justice Lewis issued a very strong dissent on this issue."' He stated that the testimony of the highway patrolman
was directly relevant to the issue of guilt, because the patrolman
had observed Graves, two hours after his arrest, staggering and
,with poor coordination." Once undisputed evidence of special
treatment entered the record, it was entirely proper for the city
to comment upon the evidence in response to Graves' own disavowal of a desire for special treatment from the jury. Justice
Lewis thus found no merit in Graves' contention that cumulative references to his official status made a fair trial impossible."
It is often stated that the trial court has broad discretion in
limiting the scope of argument and that rulings will not be overturned on appeal unless the objecting party can show affirmatively that a fair trial was not possible. 46 Typically, a trial court's
decision to permit a certain line of argument is reversed in obviously egregious circumstances. 47 For example, in a case cited by
the Graves court, the prosecutor commented on the accused's
decision not to testify and sought to minimize the jurors' sense
of personal responsibility in the imposition of the death penalty.48 As the Graves dissent makes clear, the facts here were not
nearly so dramatic, and arguably conformed to the basic requirement that argument be confined to the evidence and to issues
reasonably inferable from it. Furthermore, even if error was
committed, the court might have found it not prejudicial, since
some of the references to Graves' official position came from his
own defense.
Why, then, did the court regard reversal as necessary? Pos-

42. Id., 301 S.E.2d at 756.

43. Id. at 56, 301 S.E.2d at 756.
44. Id. at 57, 301 S.E.2d at 756.

45. Id., 301 S.E.2d at 757.
46. State v. Darden, 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587 (1975); State v. White, 246 S.C. 502,
144 S.E.2d 481 (1965); State v. Gilstrap, 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163 (1945).
47. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740 (1983); State v. Craig, 267
S.C. 262, 227 S.E.2d 306 (1976); State v. King, 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793 (1952).
48. 279 S.C. at 55, 301 S.E.2d at 755 (citing State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d
92 (1982)). In Sloan, the court held that the solicitor's arguments were improper in (1)
inviting the jury to speculate about the opinions of the defendant's attorney as to his
innocence, (2) telling the jury that acquittal would leave the crime unsolved, and (3)
commenting, during the sentencing phase, on the defendant's silence in the face of his
plea of not guilty. 278 S.C. at 438-40, 298 S.E.2d at 93-95.
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sibly, the court was reacting strongly to the prosecutor's appeal
to anti-elitist biases of the jury. From this perspective, the closing argument may be seen as directly and gratuitously inflammatory. Although it was Graves who brought up the subject of
special treatment, Cayce's arguments shifted the focus from the
prospect of special treatment in judgment to past special treatment in arrest. This shift essentially invited the jury to ignore
Graves' "regular fellow" argument and to punish him for the
special treatment he had already received, heaping upon him the
humiliation and degradation which he had been spared by a
criminal justice system in which status counts. The suggestion
that a jury approach the process of judgment as an opportunity
to penalize a defendant for the benefits automatically conferred
upon him by virtue of his social position may be so unseemly as
to constitute prejudice as a matter of law.
V. AFTER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
During the 1983 session, the Supreme Court of South Carolina signaled clearly that a criminal defendant will be required
to make a very strong showing to be awarded a new trial on the
49
grounds of newly discovered evidence. In Hayden v. State,
Justice Ness, writing for the court, applied previously adopted
standards for after-discovered evidence with uncompromising
rigor.
This case arose out of the 1974 arrest of Hayden for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At trial, Hayden argued
that he was framed. He claimed that the cocaine was planted in
his car in a conspiracy, involving agents of the South Carolina
State Law Enforcement Division and paid informants, aimed at
discrediting Hayden's testimony at an informant's pending
trial.5 0 Hayden offered no evidence to corroborate his story and
was convicted of the crime. 51 In 1978, Hayden petitioned for
post-conviction relief and received a hearing in 1980 on the issue
of after-discovered evidence. Hayden offered the testimony of
one of the informants, who was not present at the arrest, that
the conspiracy had occurred as Hayden had previously

49. 278 S.C. 610, 299 S.E.2d 854 (1983).
50. Brief of Respondent at 6.
51. Id.
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claimed. 2 The Deputy Solicitor who had tried Hayden's case
testified that he now believed the drugs had been planted and
that he would not reprosecute if Hayden's motion were
granted. 53 Although Hayden's new witness was an admitted liar,
thief, and drug dealer, the circuit court found the evidence sufficiently convincing to vacate the conviction and grant a new
trial." From this action the state appealed.
In reversing the action of the lower court, the supreme court
cited the standards which it had adopted in State v. Caskey:55
A party requesting a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence must show that the evidence: (1) Is such as would
probably change the result if a new trial was had; (2) Has been
discovered since the trial; (3) Could not by the exercise of due
diligence have been discovered before the trial; (4) Is material
to the issue of guilt or innocence; and (5) Is not merely cumulative or impeaching.58
On the facts of this case, the court found that the evidence was
not discovered after trial because the existence of the conspiracy
was known to Hayden at the time of his arrest. Furthermore,
Hayden failed to show that due diligence would not have uncovered the specific testimony offered, because the identity of the
alleged conspirators was known to him, yet, he made no effort to
subpoena them. Finally, the court stated that the offered testimony, mere hearsay from a discreditable witness, was not material to the issue of Hayden's guilt or innocence.7
In a lone but strong dissent, Justice Harwell stressed familiar principles governing the scope of appellate review.58 Harwell
stated that the granting of post-conviction relief is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and may not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion.5 9 The issue thus should have been
whether there was any basis in fact for the trial court's decision.
Harwell argued that by this standard the defense met the Cas52. Record at 191-96.
53. Id. at 212-13.
54. Id. at 243-48.
55. 273 S.C. 325, 256 S.E.2d 737 (1979).
56. 278 S.C. at 611, 299 S.E.2d at 855.
57. Id. at 612, 299 S.E.2d at 856.
58. Id. at 613, 299 S.E.2d at 856.
59. Id.
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key requirements. Any effort to secure the offered testimony at
trial would probably have been futile because it became available only after the informant was granted immunity from prosecution and after the SLED agents involved had been convicted
of drug and racketeering charges.6 0 Credibility of testimony is
traditionally an issue to be determined by the trier of fact.
The majority opinion in this case comports with a general
tendency in South Carolinae ' and other jurisdictions 2 to regard
after-discovered evidence as a strongly disfavored basis for postconviction relief. The reasons for this tendency are clear. At
some point, all convictions must become final. Furthermore, the
claim of after-discovered evidence is particularly subject to
abuse if a defendant may assert each minor discovery as a reason for a second chance with a new jury while the memories of
adverse witnesses fade. However, as the dissent highlights, this
case is conspicuous in reversing a trial court's grant of a new
trial,6 3 especially when the Deputy Solicitor who was close to the
case from its initiation was willing to see the defendant go free.
The state quite correctly argued that the Deputy Solicitor's
statement was irrelevant to Hayden's motion for post-trial relief
since the strength of the after-discovered evidence does not depend on the prosecutor's current opinion of the case, and since it
is ultimately the Attorney General's decision whether the case
will be retried." The state may have chosen to appeal this case
out of concern that the court, because of the Deputy Solicitor's
testimony, may have been too strongly influenced in the defen-

60. Id. at 614, 299 S.E.2d at 856-57.
61. See, e.g., State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 243 S.E.2d 195 (1978); State v. Pierce, 263
S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
62. See, e.g., Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1982)(motions for new trials on
the basis of newly discovered evidence are looked on with disfavor); Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 48, 301 S.E.2d 152 (1983)(motions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence are not looked upon with favor and are granted with reluctance); State v.
Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979)(if newly discovered evidence fails to
meet any of the case law requirements, the moving party is not entitled to a new trial).
63. Cf. State v. Allen, 276 S.C. 412, 279 S.E.2d 365 (1981) (grant of new trial on
after-discovered evidence reversed on basis of availability as a matter of public record of
impeaching evidence); State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 243 S.E.2d 195 (1978) (denial of motion for new trial affirmed on basis that discrepancies in testimony were discoverable at
trial); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974)(denial of motion for new trial
on basis of after-discovered evidence not error when evidence was unlikely to affect the
outcome of a new trial).
64. Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
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dant's favor by the subsequent revelations of the criminal activities of the law enforcement officials involved with his arrest. Although these revelations may be regarded as vindicating a
defendant who had claimed to be a victim of police corruption,
the state has a powerful interest in preventing every significant
discovery of police corruption from becoming a justification for
unsettling all the criminal convictions involving those police officers later found to be corrupt.
For criminal trial lawyers, the most important facet of this
case may be the court's strict application of the Caskey requirements that the evidence be, in fact, after-discovered, and that it
could not have been discovered with due diligence. The court's
holding that Hayden's entrapment defense at trial precluded his
subsequent offer of testimonial support for this assertion seems
to result from an equation of "after-discovered evidence" with
"after-discovered fact." The due diligence standard apparently
necessitates a strong affirmative showing by the defendant that
he could not possibly have procured the testimony at trial. The
fact, found crucial by the dissent,65 that the witness had the
right and the motivation at trial to assert a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination--and that defense lawyers
cannot bargain for favorable testimony with offers of immunity-was not even discussed in the majority opinion. Apparently, the court expects defendants with similar defenses to put
those suspected of frame-ups on the stand, even if the probable
result will be perjured testimony or assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination. At the very least, the record must
contain specific facts from which it can clearly be inferred that
the new evidence differs significantly in kind and quality from
the evidence known at trial, and that all leads toward discovery
of the evidence were pursued or that pursuit would have been
demonstrably futile. The defense bar must take into account
that a trial judge's decision that the Caskey standard has been
met will not receive particular deference on appeal.
VI.

EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court in State

65. 278 S.C. at 614, 299 S.E.2d at 856-57.
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v. Dinglee s addressed nine distinct issues,67 but the most important focused on the relationship between the law of evidence and
the federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants. One
broad issue was the proper application of the exclusionary rule,
a modification of traditional evidence law to enforce rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The other central concern
was the admission of possible hearsay-arguably in violation not
only of traditional hearsay doctrine but also in conflict with the
right of an accused, derived from the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, to confront the witnesses against him. In neither
area did the court break new ground. The opinion adds to the
body of law previously available to guide practitioners through
some of the greyest areas of the law.
The case stems from the 1981 murder of defendant Dingle's
estranged wife. The victim was found, shot with a .22 caliber
gun, in a Greenville nurses' dormitory where she was living, seventy miles from her husband's residence.68 Neighbors testified to
having seen Dingle at the scene on the night of the crime, to
having heard loud noises and arguments, and to having earlier
heard the victim say that she intended to tell Dingle at that
time that she planned to seek a divorce.69 Under a warrant to
search for a .22 caliber gun in Dingle's home, police seized such
a gun and also seized ammunition of the type used in the
crime.70
Dingle contested the admission into evidence of the bullets

66. 279 S.C. 278, 306 S.E.2d 223 (1983).
67. The issues raised on appeal were as follows: (1) whether the order committing
the defendant to the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health was
interlocutory and therefore not appealable; (2) whether the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to grant a motion for continuance; (3) whether the defendant's preliminary
hearing was proper; (4) whether it was necessary to excuse for good cause three jurors
who were related by blood or marriage to members of the city police department; (5)
whether ammunition seized during the lawful search of defendant's apartment should be
subject to suppression; (6) whether the admission into evidence of statements of the deceased violated the rule against hearsay; (7) whether a statement made by a witness on
the night of the murder was hearsay; (8) whether ex parte communication between the
trial court and the solicitor's office on the subject of case law concerning hearsay
prejudiced the defendant; and (9) whether the trial court was required to instruct the
jury on the law of manslaughter. Id. at 278-79, 306 S.E.2d at 223.
68. Id. at 281, 306 S.E.2d at 225.
69. Id. at 281-82, 306 S.E.2d at 226.
70. Id. at 285, 306 S.E.2d at 227-28.
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since they were not particularly described in the search warrant 1 as required under the fourth amendment.7 2 The court
held that the evidence was properly admitted under the plain
view doctrine articulated by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.7 3 That doctrine as
set forth by the South Carolina Supreme Court holds that:
In order for evidence to be seized under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, three things must
generally be shown: (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the
authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the
evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of
the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing
authorities.74

The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the warrant to
search for the .22 caliber pistol was not being used as a pretext
to search for .22 caliber ammunition.7 5 The court did not find
determinative the testimony of a police officer that he had been
informed of the type of ammunition used in the crime.7 The
court stated that the fourth amendment protects citizens from
"unreasonable" searches and seizures and that the seizure of the

ammunition was not unreasonable:
If the ammunition had been found in the chamber of a
pistol, it would hardly be argued that the bullets could not be
seized under the "pistol" search warrant. The relationship between pistol and bullet is such that seizure of the bullets would

71. Id. at 285, 306 S.E.2d at 228.
72. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
73. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the court outlined the parameters of the plain
view doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement. The court emphasized the necessity of framing the exception within the context of the two policy bases for the warrant requirement. The magistrate's scrutiny is designed to (1) eliminate searches which
are not based on probable cause and (2) limit as much as possible the scope of those
searches deemed necessary. Id. at 467. The limits of the plain view exception reflect the
underlying rationale of the warrant requirement. First, the initial intrusion must be
valid, and second, the discovery must be inadvertent. Id. at 468-70.
74. 279 S.C. at 286, 306 S.E.2d. at 227.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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be expected and required."
It is not clear how this analogy relates to the Coolidge requirements, especially to the controversial requirement of inadvertence, which has been applied but not formally adopted in
this jurisdiction.7s It seems that the court is considering inadvertence as a shorthand expression of the policy of protecting citizens from pretext searches and is not using an inadvertence requirement as a test of warrant sufficiency.79 However, allowing
police to seize bullets which are discovered, in plain view, during
the lawful execution of a warrant for guns does not significantly
erode fourth amendment policies and would neither open the
door for police to expand the scope of the search (to look in
places where ammunition, but not guns, could be expected to be
found), nor validate entrance with a warrant to discover one
thing, with the actual intent of searching for something entirely
different for which no warrant could be obtained.
Dingle's hearsay contentions raised evidentiary, constitutional, and procedural issues. First, Dingle argued that the use
of a police officer's hearsay testimony at the preliminary hearing"0 thwarted the hearing's basic purpose of apprising him of
the nature of the case against him.81 The court found that the

77. Id. at 286, 306 S.E.2d at 228.
78. See State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 274 S.E.2d 913 (1981); State v. Huggins, 275
S.C. 229, 269 S.E.2d 334 (1980); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 248 S.E.2d 475 (1978);
State v. Chandler, 267 S.C. 138, 226 S.E.2d 553 (1976); State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494,
224 S.E.2d 666 (1976); State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975); and State v.
Frank, 262 S.C. 526, 205 S.E.2d 827 (1974).
79. In Coolidge, the court stated that "where the discovery is anticipated, where the
police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is
altogether different." 403 U.S. at 470. The issue to be confronted is the level of the element of inadvertence. The standard for determining the absence of inadvertence (probable cause or a mere expectation) is unclear from Justice Stewart's opinion. Id. at 471.
However, judging the level of anticipation by a standard less stringent than that for
probable cause might undermine the objectives of the warrant requirement's protections.
80. The relevant statute provides in part:
Any magistrate who issues a warrant charging a crime beyond his jurisdiction
shall grant and hold a preliminary hearing ....
At the preliminary hearing,
the defendant may cross-examine the state's witnesses in person or by counsel,
have the reply in argument if there be counsel for the State, and be heard in
argument in person or by counsel as to whether a probable case has been made
out and as to whether the case ought to be dismissed by the magistrate and the
defendant discharged without delay.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-320 (Supp. 1983).
81. 279 S.C. at 283, 306 S.E.2d at 226.
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major purpose of the hearing was to establish probable cause
sufficient to continue with criminal proceedings, and that it was
not necessary for the state to call all potential witnesses to inform the defendant of the state's case. 82 In this instance, the
court found that the defendant was adequately apprised of the
case against him. In restating its holding that hearsay evidence
is permissible for the purpose of establishing probable cause, the
court adhered to its general rule. 83
The second hearsay argument challenged the admission of
out-of-court statements by the victim, orally to witnesses and in
writing upon her calendar, that she intended to meet Dingle and
discuss their divorce on the night of the killing.8 4 Dingle argued
that the admission of this evidence violated his right to confront
the witnesses against him, guaranteed under both the federal8 5
and state8 8 constitutions. The court dismissed this contention on
the ground that the basis for appeal was not stated with the requisite specificity,1 but then stated that it had considered the
substantive argument nonetheless and had found it to be without merit. This conclusory statement did not resolve the questions presented by this issue, since the court did not indicate
whether it found the statements not to be hearsay, or to be hearsay but not violative of the confrontation clause, or to be unconstitutional hearsay but not prejudicial-all of which were argued

82. Id.
83. See State v. Latham, 275 S.C. 550, 273 S.E.2d 772 (1981); State v. Cunningham,
275 S.C. 189, 268 S.E.2d 289 (1980); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
See also 1977 Op. S.C. Atty. Gen. 208, No. 77-271; 1977 Op. S.C. Atty. Gen. 55, No. 7753.
84. 279 S.C. at 286, 306 S.E.2d at 228.
85. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
86. "Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself or by his counsel or by both." S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 14.
87. Each exception must contain a concise statement of one proposition of law
or fact which this Court is asked to review, and the same assignment of error
should not be repeated. Each exception must contain within itself a complete
assignment of error, and a mere reference therein to any other exception then
or previously taken, or request to charge will not be considered. The exceptions
should not be long or argumentative in form.
S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 4, § 6.
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in the state's brief.8 8 In view of the complex web of decisions on
the use of hearsay evidence to show that another acted in accordance with his stated intent, it is regrettable that the court did
not articulate its reasoning.
The final hearsay objection was disposed of in a similar
manner. When a witness testified that she saw defendant and
said to her roommate on the night of the crime, "There goes the
voodoo man," the court found, without stating a rationale, that
the statement was not hearsay. 9 While this leaves open the reason why it was not hearsay, the evidence was probably admissible in any event under a res gestae or present sense impression
exception."0
Dingle raises issues which illustrate the close relationship
between evidence rules and policy as embodied in constitutional
law. The opinion clarifies the concept of inadvertence as simply
a rule against pretext searches; at the same time, it regrettably
adds to the confusion over hearsay evidence and its exceptions.
Cynthia Leigh Hammond
HarrietMcBryde Johnson

88. Brief of Respondent at 19.
89. 279 S.C. at 287, 306 S.E.2d at 228.
90. See Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); FED. R.
EvID. 803(1).
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